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Abstract 
The UK is committed to ambitious medium- and long-term climate change targets, 
including a commitment to an 80% reduction in emissions from 1990 levels by 2050. 
Whilst emissions have fallen significantly since 1990, further reductions will be 
increasingly difficult to achieve. The government has agreed carbon budgets to the late 
2020s that are consistent with the long-term 80% target. However, increasing energy 
prices since the mid-2000s and the 2008 financial crisis have led to cracks in the political 
consensus in support of these budgets and targets. 
 
This paper carries out an assessment of the feasibility of the UK’s agreed low carbon 
pathway over the medium term, with a particular focus on the fourth carbon budget 
(2023-27). It analyses the uncertainties associated with the specific changes that may be 
necessary to comply with this carbon budget – including measures to decarbonise 
electricity, heat and transport. This analysis focuses on ‘instrumental’ uncertainties 
associated with specific areas of the energy system (e.g. the decarbonisation of heat in 
households) and ‘systemic’ uncertainties that tend to have more pervasive implications 
for the energy system as a whole (e.g. uncertainties associated with public attitudes). A 
framework is developed that sets out and analyses the key uncertainties under those two 
broad categories, in terms of their complexity and their potential impact on the fourth 
carbon budget. Through the application of this framework the paper also considers 
strategies to mitigate or manage these uncertainties, and which actors could help develop 
and implement these strategies.  
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1 Introduction  
 
The UK faces multiple uncertainties in pursuing its energy and climate change goals. In a 
challenging economic climate, energy futures have recently become more uncertain and 
contested. Contrasting energy priorities are being articulated in public policy and in the 
private sector, exacerbated by controversies over energy prices and bills, shale gas 
development, onshore wind power and new nuclear power stations.  
 
Despite this contestation, the UK remains committed to ambitious climate change targets, 
underpinned by the Climate Change Act 2008. Under the Act, the UK is committed to an 
80% reduction in emissions by 2050 from 1990 levels, and a series of carbon budgets for 
the period 2008-2027 to ensure that the UK is on a pathway to meet the longer-term 
target. Although at the time the Act was passed it received strong cross-party support, 
this consensus is being challenged by more recent rises in energy prices, the impact of the 
2008 financial crisis and heightened concerns about energy security. 
 
For decades, security, sustainability and affordability have been the three key energy 
policy objectives by successive UK governments (Pearson and Watson, 2011). The 
relative importance and nature of these goals has changed over time, and they have 
sometimes been joined by other objectives such as industrial development. Whilst 
climate change has been high on the UK energy policy agenda for over a decade, recent 
statements from government Ministers show that policy is once again in a state of flux, 
with affordability being particularly prominent in political debates (Osborne, 2014; 
Davey, 2014a; Labour Party, 2013). 
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Although the scientific case for a continuing commitment to climate change targets 
continues to be very strong (IPCC, 2014a; CCC, 2013a), the tension over the goals of 
energy policy has increased uncertainty about whether and how the UK’s climate change 
targets can be met. Against this background, this paper presents an in-depth critical 
appraisal of the uncertainties facing the UK’s low carbon transition over the medium 
term. Whilst the focus of the paper is on the UK, its analysis and insights have 
international relevance. It provides a detailed, context specific interdisciplinary analysis 
of uncertainties that have been highlighted at a global level, for example by the IPCC Fifth 
Assessment Report (IPCC, 2014b). In addition, the UK was one of the first countries in the 
world to set ambitious, long-term greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets. The paper 
highlights some of the important practical challenges of achieving emissions reductions 
over the medium term that are compatible with these long-term targets.   
 
The paper draws on a major integrating research project carried out by the UK Energy 
Research Centre (UKERC), and examines the key uncertainties that could affect the 
achievability of the UK’s fourth carbon budget for the period 2023-27. This budget was 
set out by the Committee on Climate Change (CCC), an independent advisory body with a 
statutory responsibility to advise the government on climate change targets and budgets. 
The fourth budget was proposed in 2011 (CCC, 2011), reviewed in late 2013 at the 
request of the government (CCC, 2013b), and confirmed by government in 2014 (Davey, 
2014b). Many of the uncertainties discussed in this paper are analysed in more detail in 
other papers in this special issue. This paper develops and applies an interdisciplinary 
‘whole systems’ framework to assess their potential impacts – and to identify strategies 
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for policy makers and other stakeholders who are seeking to mitigate or manage them. 
This assessment includes electricity, heat and transport, and takes into account a range of 
political, economic, technological and social factors.  
 
The structure of this paper is as follows. The remainder of this section summarises the 
CCC’s advice on the fourth carbon budget, including recent revisions, and provides an 
overview of the energy system changes the CCC has proposed. Section 2 provides a 
literature review, and sets out the methods that are used in the paper. Section 3 discusses 
our analysis of the key uncertainties that could affect the UK’s progress towards meeting 
the fourth carbon budget and highlights actions that could be taken to mitigate or manage 
these uncertainties. Finally, section 5 sets out our conclusions. 
 
1.1 The UK’s climate change targets and the pathway to 2030 
 
In their original advice to government in 2011, the CCC put forward a ‘domestic action’ 
budget for 2023-2027 of 1950MtCO2e. This was accepted by government and legislated 
for in June 2011 (CCC, 2013b). The indicative 2030 target for total GHG emissions is 
310MtCO2e (240MtCO2, 70Mt non-CO2), implying a 60% reduction from 1990 levels. The 
main sectors covered by the budget are the power and industrial sectors, buildings and 
surface transport, agriculture, land-use change and forestry. 
 
According to the CCC, the acceleration of emissions reductions required to meet the 2050 
target will only be achieved if the right conditions are in place and the appropriate 
technologies have been developed by 2030. In common with many other assessments 
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(e.g. Ekins et al, 2013), the CCC argues that early power sector decarbonisation is crucial 
to meet the UK’s climate change targets. The carbon intensity of electricity generation 
should fall significantly, while electricity demand is likely to increase due to the 
electrification of heat & transport. According to the CCC analysis, the average carbon 
intensity of electricity should fall to around 50gCO2/kWh by 2030 through the addition of 
30-40GW of low-carbon generating plant during the 2020s. This translates into a 
minimum build rate of 3GW per year through the 2020s, which should be achieved 
through a combination of renewable energy technologies, fossil fuel plants with carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) and nuclear power.  This is a significantly higher build rate 
than was seen during the investment boom in gas-fired power in the UK during the 
1990s. An average of 2.1GW of plant was commissioned each year during that decade 
(Watson, Kern and Markusson, 2014). A higher build rate of 4GW per year was achieved 
between 2008 and 2012 through the deployment of a mix of gas and renewable plants 
(Blyth et al, 2014).  
 
Due to the emphasis placed on the electrification of the heat and transport sectors by 
2050, the power sector may need to approximately double in size by that date, requiring 
high levels of investment in low-carbon capacity. The CCC notes that annual investment 
requirements through the 2020s for power generation would reach approximately 
£10bn.  
 
The CCC’s revised analysis of the fourth carbon budget includes an updated abatement 
scenario (CCC, 2013b). This most recent analysis includes less ambitious assumptions for 
heat pump and electric vehicle uptake. It also revises the Committee’s views on the likely 
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effectiveness of efficiency measures in buildings and increases the level of ambition for 
district heating. The updated abatement scenario results in a lower fourth budget of 
1690MtCO2e, partly due to a decreased baseline emissions projection.  
 
While it would appear that the original budget could be met more easily, the CCC did not 
suggest a revision to the original recommended budget. This is due to unresolved 
uncertainties relating to the updated abatement scenario and EU climate change targets. 
Moreover, the fourth carbon budget review recommends the same power generation 
intensity for 2030 (50gCO2/kWh), even though estimated power sector emissions for 
2030 are lower than in the original assessment.  
2 Methods  
 
There is an extensive social science literature on uncertainty in the energy sector. Some 
of this literature is more conceptually driven and reflexive (e.g. Stirling, 2011; Hughes, 
2013), while other contributions are more application-oriented (Ekins et al., 2013; Foxon, 
2013). As Hughes and Strachan (2010) note, there is also a distinction between those 
studies which focus primarily on techno-economic uncertainties and those that 
emphasise social, political and institutional uncertainties. Our aim here, building on Skea 
et al (2011), is to develop an analytical framework that includes socio-political and 
techno-economic uncertainties alongside wider environmental impacts. 
 
Several research projects were commissioned by UKERC to synthesise, draw on, and 
contribute to, this literature – and to inform the uncertainties project. These included 
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research on the treatment of uncertainty in energy system scenarios (McDowall et al., 
2014); stakeholder perceptions of UK energy system risks (Prpich et al, 2014); and 
methodologies for analysing and managing uncertainty (Davies et al., 2014). This section 
summarises some of the main findings of these reviews and the wider literature, and 
shows how they have informed the methodology for this paper. 
 
An important finding from McDowall et al.’s (2014) review of energy scenarios is the 
unexpectedness of change, in that actual developments often lie outside the ranges of the 
imagined futures. Because scenario exercises tend to reflect the prevailing forces and 
interests at the time, the forces that prove to be important are often downplayed or 
overlooked. McDowall et al. (2014) argue that more deterministic scenario approaches 
based on quantitative energy system models tend to under-represent the scale and scope 
of uncertainties facing energy system development. They conclude that more attention is 
needed to the range and character of uncertainties addressed in energy scenario 
exercises, with greater focus on social, political and institutional uncertainties.  
 
Similarly, the work by Prpich et al. (2014) on energy system risks and stakeholder 
perceptions, recognised the challenges of decision-making under uncertainty. They 
emphasise that energy system change is shaped by a complex mix of changing politics, 
technologies, finance and demographics.  Given this, it is unlikely that more time and 
better data will resolve uncertainties for strategies with long-term implications, and 
decisions must inevitably be made based on imperfect existing information. They argue 
that exploratory scenario techniques can help decision makers understand energy from a 
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systems perspective, and to develop strategies that are resilient to future change 
(Ackhoff, 1971).  
 
Another important strand of literature emphasises the limitations of formal risk analysis 
methods that quantify likelihood and consequences.  Under conditions of deep 
uncertainty such as those that characterise the future of the UK energy system, other 
more deliberative methods are required to ‘open up’ decision making processes to a 
wider range of perspectives and possible futures (Stirling, 1998; 2002; 2003).  
 
This literature also shows that risk and uncertainty typologies are often overlapping, 
contradictory and subjective (Walker et al. 2010). Efforts to overcome these problems 
have resulted in development of complex solutions that may not be pragmatic (Skinner et 
al. 2013). When confronted with systemic, pervasive uncertainties, there can be a 
tendency to inertia or inaction.  
 
In response to these limitations, several typologies have been developed to help 
characterise systemic uncertainties and identify which of them could be managed or 
resolved. According to Davies et al (2014), these uncertainties can be differentiated by 
the extent to which they are random (or ‘aleatory’) or a reflection of limited current 
understandings (‘epistemic’). The magnitude and diversity of these uncertainties 
generally increases when they apply to whole systems (Walker et al., 2003). This 
typology draws on conceptual developments by Funtowicz and Ravetz (1990). They 
characterise decision-making under uncertainty with respect to two factors: the breadth 
of knowledge involved (which they term ‘system uncertainty’) and breadth of values 
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associated with a problem (which they call ‘decision stakes’). Table 1 summarises these 
factors.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Drawing on these insights, this paper’s analytical framework assesses UK energy system 
uncertainties according to their pervasiveness and complexity, and their potential impact 
on compliance with UK climate change targets, particularly the 4th Carbon Budget. The 4th 
carbon budget was chosen because it focuses on a timescale where uncertainties are 
significant. The budget is also underpinned by detailed and publicly available analysis of 
the energy system changes that would be required to comply with it. This analysis can 
therefore be used as a ‘point of reference’ for a wider examination of energy system 
uncertainties and their potential impact on compliance. 
 
To characterise the pervasiveness of these uncertainties, this paper draws on Millar and 
Lessard (2008) who contrast specific and systemic risks. Our analysis distinguishes 
between more bounded ‘instrumental’ uncertainties that relate to specific energy 
technologies or components of the energy system, and pervasive ‘systemic’ uncertainties 
that could have an impact on overall energy system development. On complexity, we 
simplify Davies et al.’s application of Funtowicz and Ravetz’s (1990) model that was 
summarised in Table 1. We use this simplified model to draw a distinction between ‘low’ 
and ‘high’ states of complexity for decision-making. In low complexity states, the number 
of variables, the range of uncertainty with respect to those variables, and the breadth of 
values involved is bounded and well-known. In high complexity states, there are multiple 
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variables, some of which are difficult to characterise, and relatively diverse values 
involved. 
 
This paper draws on detailed research conducted in the UKERC uncertainties project, the 
results of which are reported elsewhere in this special issue. This research focuses on 
areas of energy system uncertainty that could have a significant impact on compliance 
with UK climate targets. A further criterion for the selection of the areas to be covered 
was the strength of the evidence-base from UKERC’s research programme. This selection 
process was carried out in consultation with the project advisory group, which included 
representatives from government, industry and the research community. This group also 
provided feedback on the detailed analysis that was conducted on these uncertainties, 
and on options for integration and synthesis.  
 
The final selection of areas of uncertainty is as follows: investment in low carbon power 
generation; technological innovation and deployment for low carbon power generation; 
networks for low carbon heat; household heat demand; the adoption of electric vehicles 
by consumers; ecosystem service impacts of low carbon resources and technologies; 
public attitudes and values in relation to energy system futures; and the assessment of 
natural resources.  
 
The research teams working on each of these papers were asked to relate their analysis 
to the CCC’s revised 4th carbon budget analysis – and to consider which uncertainties 
might impact on the UK’s compliance with this budget. This helped to facilitate the 
integration of their findings into a whole systems assessment for this paper. 
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3 Results and discussion 
 
A summary of the uncertainties that have been identified is provided in Tables 2 and 3. In 
line with the analytical framework developed in the previous section, Table 2 summarises 
eight particularly important instrumental uncertainties that were identified, whilst Table 
3 focuses on six systemic uncertainties that were highlighted by our analysis. 
 
The assessments summarised in these tables were carried out by the authors of this 
paper, based on the detailed evidence provided by the research teams who analysed 
specific areas of uncertainty (e.g. investment in power generation). They are designed to 
provide a high level guide to the extent and importance of the uncertainties concerned. 
 
The second column of Tables 2 and 3 applies the typology set out in Table 1 in this paper. 
As explained in the previous section, the assessment in this column identifies different 
levels of complexity associated with each uncertainty- ranging from ‘low’ to ‘high’. The 
third column of Tables 2 and 3 suggests how large an impact each uncertainty could have 
on the achievement of the fourth carbon budget pathway. 
 
The fourth column summarises some actions that could be taken to partly or fully resolve 
the uncertainty, or to inform better decision making if resolution is unlikely to be 
achieved. Finally, the fifth column suggests which actors could implement strategies that 
might help to mitigate or better understand the uncertainty concerned. Within this 
column, the generic term ‘citizens’ has been used to denote the involvement of 
individuals or communities. Similarly, the term ‘businesses’ has been used to include a 
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range of different types of business – from large-scale utilities to small firms involved in 
the energy efficiency supply chain. Roles for government are also suggested at a number 
of levels – including national, devolved and local government within the UK, and foreign 
governments in cases where international policy processes are likely to be important.  
3.1 Instrumental uncertainties 
 [Insert Table 2 about here] 
3.1.1 Uncertainties for electricity generation 
 
As discussed in section 1, the decarbonisation of the UK power sector by 2030 has been 
shown to be essential to meet the UK’s longer-term climate targets whilst minimising 
costs (CCC, 2011; Ekins et al, 2013). The UK power generation sector will need to attract 
significantly higher levels of investment. There is a need to renew the UK’s ageing 
generation fleet, and to shift towards capital-intensive low-carbon forms of generation.  
 
Our analysis highlighted two inter-related areas of uncertainty that are particularly 
important (see Table 2): first, the availability of financial capital, and the extent to which 
available capital will be attracted to the UK power sector; and second, the extent to which 
technology uncertainties affect the availability of that capital.  
 
Several recent studies have raised concerns about whether the UK electricity sector may 
be able to attract sufficient investment in low carbon power generation (e.g. Ofgem, 2010; 
Committee on Climate Change, 2013c). Estimates of the amount of capital required range 
from the government estimate of £110bn for electricity generation and transmission by 
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2020 to much higher figures of £200bn to over £300bn by 2030 (Blyth et al, 2014). 
Comparing a range of different published estimates, the average amount of investment 
required is £6.1bn/year (3.4 GW per year of new capacity) to 2020. This increases to 
£12.3bn (5.7 GW) by 2030.  
 
These projections are considerably higher than the average for the 2000s (£1.1bn/year). 
Since 2009, investment has increased significantly. During the period 2009-2012, average 
capacity additions were 4 GW per year, with average annual capital investment of £4.6bn. 
However, major questions remain about whether these rates can be sustained. There are 
signs that reduced demand and other market conditions are causing the major utilities to 
scale back planned capital expenditure by as much as 30% by 2015 relative to 2012 
levels. They are attempting to de-leverage their balance sheets in order to maintain 
reasonable credit ratings and access to the low-cost bonds and shares on which their 
business model depends.  
 
Finance sector organisations interviewed for the UKERC uncertainties project tended to 
say there is not a lack of money, but a lack of good projects (Blyth et al, 2014). Whilst 
finance is available in principle, the vast majority of money in financial markets is 
directed to low risk investments. 90% of funds held by the largest institutional investors 
are in bonds and shares of investment-grade companies. Whilst higher risk capital is 
available, volumes are probably too small to address the scale of infrastructure 
investment required. More capital could be made available by institutional investors, but 
this would depend on a significant reduction in the risks of investing in low carbon power 
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generation in the UK are reduced. It is not yet clear whether recently implemented 
Electricity Market Reform policies will be sufficient to reduce these risks. 
 
One of the reasons why this investment is seen as risky is that some low-carbon 
technologies are not yet fully commercialised. Some are at the full-scale demonstration 
stage (e.g. CCS), whilst others are in the early deployment stage (e.g. offshore wind). 
There are relatively few low-carbon technologies that could make a significant 
contribution to reducing emissions in the electricity sector transition to 2030. Key 
technologies include CCS, nuclear, offshore wind and other renewables such as onshore 
wind and solar PV. Therefore, a lack of progress with one or more of these could have 
significant implications for the decarbonisation of the electricity sector. Many of the most 
immediate uncertainties involved here relate directly to capital or operating costs, but 
other factors such as availability and reliability can also have important cost, 
environmental or security impacts. Even if low carbon technologies progress to maturity 
and reliability, some of them may have wider environmental impacts – for example on 
ecosystem services (see discussion in section 3.2). Security impacts could play out over a 
shorter timescale: e.g. a shortfall in generation capacity could occur if plant availability is 
lower than expected, or if construction takes longer than expected.  
 
Further uncertainty arises from the fact that UK funding for technology development and 
deployment is fragmented. Whilst this provides a variety of institutional approaches that 
can be tailored to the specific needs of each ‘family’ of low carbon technologies, it makes 
oversight of the innovation process more complex. Despite efforts at coordination 
between innovation support bodies, decentralisation makes it harder to share learning. 
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This is exacerbated by the difficulties that public sector institutions face of dealing with, 
and learning from, technology ‘failures’.   
 
The difficulty of openly identifying and discussing technology failure is compounded by 
the political need to show that all low carbon options are kept open – at least for the next 
few years (DECC, 2011). Doing so in practice will continue to require significant political 
capital as well as financial capital. Contemporary controversies about technologies such 
as onshore wind and nuclear power suggest that the availability of both political and 
financial capital availability will have limits. 
 
Taking this analysis into account, our assessment is that the level of complexity with 
respect to both of these power generation uncertainties is ‘medium’ (see Table 2). Given 
that power sector decarbonisation is critical for meeting the UK’s fourth carbon budget, 
the impact of not resolving these uncertainties sufficiently is judged to be ‘high’. 
 
3.1.2 Uncertainties for low carbon heat 
 
Heat constitutes the single biggest use of energy in the UK (Chaudry et al, 2014). Almost 
half (46%) of UK final energy consumption is used to provide heat. Around 75% of heat is 
used by households, commercial and public buildings. Household heating demand is met 
using gas-fired boilers (81%), electricity (7%), heating oil (9%) and from solid fuels such 
as wood and coal (3%). Meeting the 80% emissions reduction target for 2050 is likely to 
require that heat related emissions from buildings are almost zero by 2050, and that 
emissions from industry are reduced by 70% from 1990 levels (Chaudry et al, 2014). 
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The UKERC uncertainties project focused on two aspects of low carbon heat: the 
implications of heat decarbonisation for energy network infrastructures including those 
for gas, electricity and heat (Chaudry et al, 2014); and options for reducing carbon 
emissions from household heating (Eyre and Baruah, 2014). As Table 2 shows, we 
identified four instrumental uncertainties from this research: the diversity of low carbon 
heat pathways; the performance of heat pumps; investment in district heating; and 
progress with energy efficiency. 
 
The UKERC research on household heat explored four different scenarios for 
decarbonisation. These include an ‘electrification’ scenario in which electricity demand 
rises significantly because electric heating systems (mainly heat pumps) are installed 
throughout the UK. It also includes a ‘deep balanced transition’ scenario that includes 
greater demand reduction, an expansion of heat networks and a much smaller role for 
electric heating.  
 
This analysis shows that the main challenge for low carbon heat will be shifting away 
from the widespread use of natural gas. This is perhaps more important than the 
electrification of heat per se, given that other complementary routes to low carbon 
heating could be compatible with the fourth carbon budget. This means that failing to 
reach the CCC’s target for electricity decarbonisation by 2030 would not necessarily have 
a significant impact on progress with heat decarbonisation by that date. Taking this 
analysis into account, our assessment for the diversity of heat decarbonisation pathways 
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is a ‘high’ level of complexity. The impact on compliance with the fourth carbon budget is 
judged to be ‘medium’ because of the availability of different technological options. 
 
Even in scenarios where electrification is less significant, there is still a role for electric 
heating using low carbon technologies such as heat pumps. This means that the 
performance of heat pumps, and the rate at which households and businesses adopt 
them, should continue to receive a significant amount of attention. The CCC’s revised 
analysis published in 2013 includes heat pump deployment of 82TWh. This represents a 
50% reduction on the level included in their original analysis because of higher 
investment costs and poorer performance than originally expected (Chaudry et al, 2014). 
Other uncertainties that will affect adoption rates include the availability of space for 
installation, consumer attitudes to noise, and the relatively high heating requirements of 
many UK households due to poor levels of insulation. There are also potentially 
significant implications for the electricity network if adoption is widespread because 
annual and peak electricity demand would increase significantly. The widespread 
deployment of heat pumps in the ‘electrification of heat’ scenario could mean an 
additional electricity system winter peak load of 40GW. 
 
Our assessment with respect to heat pump performance uncertainties is that complexity 
is ‘low’ because many of the barriers to adoption are well known. However, the potential 
impact on compliance with the fourth carbon budget is ‘medium’ because heat pumps are 
a key technology for heat decarbonisation in government strategies. 
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The amount of low carbon heat that will need to be provided will be heavily dependent 
on progress with energy efficiency. Energy scenarios have consistently emphasized the 
importance of energy efficiency (Ekins et al, 2013). From 2004 -2012, the long term trend 
of rising household energy demand in the UK reversed due to large, policy driven 
programmes of loft and cavity wall insulation and condensing boilers outpacing rising 
service demands. However, this trend may change due to the lower availability of low 
cost measures and the recent cuts to UK residential energy efficiency programmes 
(Rosenow and Eyre, 2013). An important uncertainty for heat decarbonisation is the 
extent to which policies to improve energy efficiency will be strong enough. For example, 
stronger incentives for householders, landlords and tenants to improve the fabric of 
existing buildings will reduce the amount of low carbon heat required. Therefore, our 
assessment is that uncertainties relating to energy efficiency improvement are 
characterised by a ‘medium’ level of complexity, with a ‘high’ impact on fourth carbon 
budget compliance if they are not resolved. 
 
This analysis also shows that there is a need for further demonstration and early 
deployment of low carbon heat technologies to determine which solutions work best in 
which contexts. Whilst technologies such as district heating and heat pumps are not new, 
their levels of deployment are relatively low in the UK. Demonstration and testing is 
needed to develop financial models, explore regulatory changes that may be necessary, 
and to engage householders, businesses and other organisations.  
 
Heat networks will only be useful in the long-term if heat is produced from low carbon 
energy sources. District heating can be flexible, and can use bioenergy or biogas instead 
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of natural gas. However, there are potentially competing demands for bioenergy 
resources or the land that would be used to grow them, and significant sustainability 
concerns about expanding their use (see section 3.2). 
 
The main challenges for district heating implementation in the UK are non-technical. 
Barriers to implementation include constraints on the availability of finance available to 
the Local Authorities who would like to develop district heating schemes. In addition, 
there may be issues of public acceptance, especially if a switch from individual heating 
systems is planned. Given that district heating is still relatively unusual in the UK, our 
judgement is that these uncertainties are characterised by a ‘medium’ level of complexity. 
However, the potential impact on fourth carbon budget compliance is ‘low’ because of the 
other options available to decarbonise heat over that time period. 
 
3.1.3 Uncertainties for low carbon transport 
 
As with heating, there are a number of ways to decarbonise surface transport. Emissions 
depend on a range of factors including the vehicle stock, the spatial distribution of the 
built environment, working practices, population demographics and habits of 
consumption (Banister and Anable, 2009). Technological innovations such as electric 
vehicles (EVs) may not be sufficient on their own.  
 
The analysis for the UKERC uncertainties project focused in particular on private road 
transport and the potential for EVs. This was due to the importance of EVs in the CCC’s 
fourth carbon budget analysis, and the greater UK policy and industry emphasis on EVs in 
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comparison to other vehicle technologies. However, it is important to recognize that 
other technologies also have significant potential – and still are being developed actively. 
Moreover, the enthusiasm for EVs should be viewed with caution because there have 
been previous ‘hype cycles’ in this sector (Budde et al., 2013). These have included the 
expanding and contracting interest in hydrogen and biofuel vehicles during the past 
decade or so.  
 
Uncertainties about which low carbon vehicle technologies will be widely adopted, and 
about the potential for other measures to reduce transport emissions, are reflected in the 
assessment in Table 2. Uncertainties about transport decarbonisation pathways were 
judged to have a ‘high’ level of complexity. The impact of these uncertainties on 
compliance with the 4th carbon budget was judged to be ‘medium’ because of the number 
of potential routes to reducing emissions – including modal shifts and improvements in 
conventional vehicle efficiency.  
 
With respect to EV adoption, our assessment is that the level of complexity is ‘medium’, 
due to the multiple factors that will influence adoption rates. The impact on the 4th 
carbon budget is also judged to be ‘medium’. This is partly due to the reduced level of 
ambition for EV adoption by 2020 in the CCC’s revised analysis (CCC, 2013b). While the 
estimated 2030 uptake of EVs remains unchanged at 60% of new cars, the assumptions to 
2020 were revised to reflect a lower adoption rate of adoption. This, in turn, reflects the 
slower than expected rate of adoption so far. There were only 1742 new registrations of 
EVs in 2012, which accounted for 0.08% of total new car registrations (DfT, 2013). In 
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order to reach the level assumed by the CCC, registration rates of EVs will have to double 
every year to 2020.  
 
Research on EVs for the UKERC uncertainties project identified a range of factors and 
uncertainties that will affect future adoption (Morton, Anable and Brand, 2014). It 
identified three areas where action by government, industry and other actors could help 
to mitigate uncertainties in the short to medium term. First, whilst there are generous 
grants for the purchase of EVs, there is significant uncertainty about the government’s 
commitment to incentives such as lower levels of annual road tax.  
 
Second, the lack of an integrated payment mechanism for EV charging is creating 
significant inconvenience and confusion for EV users – a situation that could be alleviated 
by greater standardisation. Third, there is a need for more robust methodologies for the 
estimation of the environmental performance, costs and range limitations of EVs to 
provide the industry, government and consumers with greater confidence. 
 
3.2 Systemic uncertainties 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
Six systemic uncertainties were identified as having potentially important impacts on the 
achievability of the fourth carbon budget (see Table 3). These relate to the future 
availability and price of fossil fuels, bioenergy and scarce material resources, the impact 
of UK energy systems on national and global ecosystem services, public attitudes towards 
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energy system change and the overarching political commitment to a low carbon 
pathway. 
 
There are significant differences in the availability of the natural resources used in the 
energy system. Some resources are finite (e.g. fossil fuels), some are renewable (e.g. 
biomass), and some are potentially recyclable (e.g. critical metals). While availability 
estimates are often highly uncertain and contested, they can strongly influence 
underlying assumptions and perspectives that inform the evolution of energy policies. 
Biomass and fossil fuels (especially natural gas) are particularly relevant to the fourth 
carbon budget pathway (Speirs et al, 2014). Critical metals are also of interest due to 
their anticipated use in a number of low-carbon technologies – and therefore, these are 
also included in the systematic uncertainties summarised in Table 3. 
   
A key source of uncertainty regarding fossil fuels is the lack of a universally agreed 
definition of the terms used to describe their availability. In some cases terms such as 
‘reserves’ and ‘economically producible volumes’ are used interchangeably, while some 
studies subdivide the ‘reserves’ of a commodity depending on the uncertainty in its 
recoverability. Furthermore fossil fuels may also be classified according to the properties 
of the commodity produced, or the technologies used to produce it (e.g. ‘conventional’ or 
‘unconventional’ oil). There is no agreed definition of these terms, which can lead to 
confusion resulting from: 1) equating inconsistent terms; 2) equating terms that contain 
differing assumptions; or 3) the use of identical sounding terminology when authors are 
in fact referring to different things. 
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A good illustration of these uncertainties is the estimation of shale gas resources. In this 
case, these definitional uncertainties are compounded by uncertainties due to the lack of 
detailed data and the use of methods that extrapolate resource estimates from experience 
in the USA (McGlade et al, 2013). In addition to these physical, technical and economic 
uncertainties, shale gas is subject to sustainability concerns (e.g. water availability) and 
socio-political uncertainties (e.g. impacts on landscape and property values). As recent 
UK controversies have shown, these concerns can have a direct impact on the extent to 
which such resources can be developed quickly. The result of these uncertainties is 
evident in the range of available shale gas estimates that were reviewed in 2012 by the 
European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (Pearson et al, 2012). A review of ten 
available estimates of global shale gas resources revealed a range from 7 trillion cubic 
meters (Tcm) to 206 Tcm, with a mean of 100 Tcm.  
 
Due to these multiple uncertainties, the complexity of fossil fuel resource uncertainties 
has been assessed as ‘high’. Whilst systematic evidence reviews such as UKERC’s review 
of the evidence for global oil depletion (Sorrell et al, 2009) can help to clarify the reasons 
why estimates vary so widely, the policy implications are particularly challenging. 
Contrary to official government projections over the past few years, fossil fuels may turn 
out to be more abundant and cheaper than expected as a result of unconventional 
resource development. Therefore, the potential impact on compliance with the fourth 
carbon budget is also judged to be ‘high’.  
 
Bioenergy is a renewable energy resource that has a significant potential to substitute for 
fossil fuels, but is subject to many uncertainties about future availability (Slade et al 
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2011). Whilst the physical, technical and economic uncertainties are not well understood, 
biomass reserve and resource estimates are particularly sensitive to sustainability and 
socio-political uncertainties. The inter-linkages between biomass and food production 
have resulted in a debate about the sustainability of large-scale bioenergy use, and the 
extent to which policy support can be justified. In addition to food production and 
biodiversity concerns, conflicts can arise with established uses of biomass resources (e.g. 
the pulp and paper industry).  
 
These observations are supported by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
2011 Special Report on renewable energy (IPCC, 2011), which concludes that the 
technical potential of biomass depends on “factors that are inherently uncertain” and 
cannot be determined precisely while societal preferences are unclear. For these reasons, 
our assessment is that uncertainties relating to the availability of biomass resources have 
a ‘high’ level of complexity. This assessment concluded that there could be a ‘medium’ 
potential impact on carbon budget compliance due to the availability of alternative 
resources for low carbon transport, heat and electricity.  
 
The analysis of potential ecosystem service impacts for the UKERC uncertainties project 
(Dockerty et al, 2014) focused on the entire life cycle, including upstream infrastructure, 
the fuel cycle (e.g. mining and processing), operation (e.g. power generation) and 
downstream activities (e.g. decommissioning). It included local (UK) and international 
impacts on a range of ecosystem services, split into four main categories (Haines-Young 
and Potschin, 2012): supporting services (e.g. nutrient cycling and photosynthesis); 
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provisioning services (e.g. water, energy and food); regulation services (e.g. pollution and 
climate control); and maintenance and cultural services (e.g. recreation). 
 
The review focused on supply side options including power generation technologies 
(nuclear power, carbon capture and storage, onshore wind and offshore wind) and 
natural resources (gas and biomass). The biomass assessment focused on domestically 
produced miscanthus and short rotation coppice. These options were chosen since they 
feature strongly in the CCC’s fourth carbon budget analysis, particularly their scenarios 
for reducing power sector emissions intensity to 50gCO2/kWh by 2030.  
 
The review shows that the evidence base is patchy and weak. Studies tend to be 
‘clustered’ into relatively small areas of energy life cycles or related to relatively few 
ecosystem service indicators. This meant that expert judgements were often required to 
interpret and synthesise this data, especially with respect to global impacts. The 
relatively small number of studies identified may be due to limitations in the approach, 
reflect terms employed in database searches, or be indicative of a real lack of data. None 
of the ecosystem service impacts identified by the review are likely to be sufficiently 
negative to rule out the combinations of energy supply options included within the CCC’s 
fourth carbon budget pathway. More importantly, these options are likely to result in 
fewer negative impacts on ecosystem services and natural capital than the current 
reliance on fossil fuels. However, the gaps in the evidence base, combined with the 
difficulty of valuing or comparing different impacts directly, led us to assess the level of 
complexity to be ‘high’ in this case. The potential impacts on compliance with the fourth 
carbon budget were judged to be ‘medium’ because controversies about cultural service 
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impacts of some energy technologies (especially onshore wind) are already affecting 
rates of deployment. 
 
The final two systemic uncertainties shown in Table 3 relate to public attitudes and 
political commitment to decarbonisation.  As this paper has already noted, the increasing 
amount of controversy surrounding the direction of energy policy has increased the level 
of political uncertainty in the UK. Due to these challenges to the political consensus that 
has prevailed since the mid 2000s, the political commitment uncertainty was assessed to 
have a ‘medium’ level of complexity, and a ‘high’ potential impact on carbon budget 
compliance if it is not resolved. 
 
Even if this consensus can be strengthened in the future, engagement with publics will be 
crucial to achieve a coalition for change between government, industry and civil society 
(Butler et al, 2014). UKERC’s in depth research on public attitudes to energy system 
change shows that it will be important to go beyond simplistic discussions of ‘public 
acceptance’ of particular energy options – and to engage publics with the choices 
involved in low carbon policies and strategies (Parkhill et al, 2013). This research shows 
that publics are concerned with a wider range of issues than expert debates suggest. It 
identified six groups of values that underpin public preferences. These values represent 
common ‘cultural resources’ upon which public preferences are formed.  
 
Through revealing these values, UKERC research also found that publics are interested in 
how energy transitions should be organised and paid for, not just in what technologies 
might be deployed. Whilst framings such as those in the CCC’s fourth carbon budget 
29 
 
report reflect some of these values, they do not engage with the full range of public 
concerns (Butler et al, 2014). Furthermore, although many of the specific technical 
options set out by the CCC to meet the fourth carbon budget (e.g. renewable energy and 
energy efficiency) align with these values, support for others (e.g. nuclear power) is more 
conditional. Some options are viewed by publics as potential ‘non transitions’ because 
they do not fit with values associated with environmental protection and long-term 
improvement and quality (Butler et al. 2013). They include carbon capture and storage 
(since it enables the continuing use of fossil fuels) and bioenergy (because of concerns 
about their sustainability).  
 
Due to the contested nature of some of these technological options – and the partial 
attention to public concerns in the fourth carbon budget pathway – our assessment is that 
uncertainties associated with public attitudes have a ‘high’ level of complexity. In 
addition, the potential impact of not addressing these uncertainties on the achievability of 
the fourth carbon budget is also ‘high’. 
4 Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper has discussed some of the key uncertainties for the UK energy system, and 
identified policies and strategies to mitigate or better understand these uncertainties. At 
the outset, we acknowledged the growing political uncertainties about the future 
direction of UK energy policy. Whilst the UK government remains committed to 
significant emissions reductions, political controversy about energy policy goals has the 
potential to compound some of the uncertainties discussed in Section 3.  
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The paper has shown that uncertainties for the UK energy system operate on different 
levels, and have widely different potential impacts. It has analysed eight instrumental 
uncertainties associated with specific areas of energy system change. It has also 
examined six systemic uncertainties that are more pervasive, and could potentially have 
implications for the energy system as a whole. 
 
Some of these uncertainties can be mitigated to some extent by government and other 
actors. A framework has been developed to assess these uncertainties in terms of their 
complexity, their potential impact on the fourth carbon budget, and the actions that could 
be taken to mitigate or better understand them.  
 
In common with other research (e.g. CCC, 2013b; Ekins et al, 2013) this paper emphasises 
the importance of power sector decarbonisation by 2030. In principle, there is no 
shortage of investment capital to achieve this. However, further changes to policy 
frameworks and business models may be needed to attract that capital to the UK power 
sector. This is partly due to the significant risks associated with capital-intensive low 
carbon power generation technologies. It is also because of the constraints on the 
availability of investment capital from incumbent utilities.  
 
A limited number of large-scale low carbon technologies can make a significant impact on 
emissions by 2030. All of them face economic, technical and political challenges. Smaller 
scale technologies such as solar PV and decentralised bioenergy plants could also play an 
important role. Given the financial resources required and the political tensions about 
some of these technologies in the UK (especially wind power), it will be hard for the UK 
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government to keep all options open. Limits to political capital may be just as important 
as constraints on financial capital (e.g. Mitchell, 2007). Once there is more information, 
for example about costs and cost trajectories, some prioritisation is likely to be necessary.  
 
By contrast, there is more flexibility with respect to heat and transport decarbonisation 
before 2030. Whilst there has been a policy focus on electrification of these sectors, 
delays with electricity decarbonisation would not necessarily prevent emissions 
reductions. However, it would mean that other routes to reduce emissions would need to 
receive more attention – and that the impact of uncertainties about these would be 
potentially greater. Furthermore, the use of electric heating technologies is still likely to 
be important in most scenarios (Eyre and Baruah, 2014). 
 
Since it is not yet clear what combination of electrification and/or other low carbon 
options will reduce transport and heat emissions in the UK most effectively, there should 
be a continuing emphasis on experimentation and demonstration. It is also important 
that the lessons from experiments are learned and shared. Many demonstrations are 
already underway or planned. In some cases, these are needed to test and refine 
relatively new technologies such as air source heat pumps. But in many cases, the 
purpose of such demonstrations is to learn about non-technical factors such as consumer 
attitudes, business models and the extent to which regulatory frameworks need to 
change. For example, district heating networks are not new but their unfamiliarity in the 
UK mean that there are significant non-technical barriers to investment.   
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One corollary of this greater flexibility is the need for more focus on energy efficiency, 
particularly in buildings. Further progress with energy efficiency could help to keep 
emissions reductions on track if electricity decarbonisation and/or the deployment of 
heat pumps are not as successful as planned. Furthermore, energy efficiency would also 
help to reduce consumers’ bills and to make them more resilient to energy security risks 
– particularly those that increase fossil fuel prices.  
 
The systemic uncertainties discussed in this report also merit more attention by policy 
makers and other actors. In particular, there is a need to move beyond narrow framings 
of public attitudes. Some debates on energy policies and choices still focus on ‘persuading 
the public to accept’ a given set of technologies rather than asking the public in the kind 
of energy system they would like to see. In addition, public views are sometimes 
represented in media and political discourse about energy systems as fickle or irrational 
(e.g. Wintour, 2014). 
 
Recent research shows very clearly that broader engagement with public perspectives is 
both desirable and necessary (Pidgeon et al, 2014). This could not only increase the 
chances of public support for change, it could also open up possibilities for compromise 
within public responses. This could include, for example, higher levels of acceptance of 
less desirable aspects of system change (e.g. some continued fossil fuel use) in a context 
where there is a greater sense that there is a clear long-term vision for change around 
which diverse publics can coalesce. This research also shows that visions for change 
should go beyond technologies, and should also focus on the way in which the energy 
system could be organized and paid for.  
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The transition to a low carbon energy system implies a significant reduction in the use of 
fossil fuels. Scaling back the UK’s low carbon ambitions would risk prolonging reliance on 
fossil fuels, and the exposure of consumers and the UK economy to the potential impacts 
of high fossil fuel prices. If fossil fuel prices remain high, or rise further, consumer bills 
are likely to be higher in 2020 than they would be if low carbon policies were pursued 
successfully (DECC, 2013). Furthermore, if a reduced emphasis on decarbonisation by the 
UK were matched by similar trends elsewhere in the world, the likelihood of significant 
climate change will increase (IPCC, 2014). This would make it much more likely that the 
UK and other countries would be subject to large impacts from climate change, and the 
costs and other implications associated with those impacts.   
 
Whilst it is impossible to predict future fossil fuel prices, it would not be prudent to 
assume a low fossil fuel price future. The shale gas revolution in the United States has led 
to low natural gas prices in that country, but there are significant doubts about the 
development of shale resources in the UK – and whether such developments would affect 
prices (Stevens, 2013). This reinforces the need to pursue many of the strategies set out 
in Tables 2 and 3, particularly those such as energy efficiency and diversification that are 
designed to mitigate the exposure of consumers to the energy security risks of fossil fuel 
dependency.  
 
Natural resources will continue to be important if the low carbon transition continues as 
planned. The global and national availability and price of fossil fuels and bioenergy 
resources is subject to significant uncertainties. (Slade et al, 2011; Speirs et al, 2014) 
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Furthermore, controversies and concerns about these resources – particularly shale gas 
and biomass – may limit the extent to which they can be developed and used.  
 
Similarly, the transition to a low carbon energy system will have uncertain implications 
for ecosystems – and the services those ecosystems provide. All four of the low carbon 
power generation scenarios analysed by the CCC to 2030 will have upstream and 
downstream consequences for ecosystem services. Whilst the evidence suggests that low 
carbon technologies will have fewer and/or less serious impacts than fossil fuels, it also 
shows that the evidence base is weak, and needs to be strengthened significantly.  
 
Finally, it will not be possible to resolve all of the uncertainties that will impact on the 
UK’s low carbon plans – at least not in the short term. As Tables 2 and 3 show, systemic 
uncertainties tend to have a higher level of complexity than instrumental uncertainties – 
and may therefore be particularly difficult to resolve. 
 
Some strategis that could mitigate these more intractable uncertainties have been 
outlined in Tables 2 and 3. Some strategies emphasise support for a diverse range of 
potential technologies or policies, to promote learning about the most effective options. 
They also include the application of tools and techniques to understand or manage such 
uncertainties more effectively (Davies et al, 2014). These tools can also help to ensure 
that energy strategies are more robust to a range of future developments and outcomes.   
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Table 1: Typology of Decision-making under Uncertainty 
 
 System uncertainty Decision stakes 
Low ‘Puzzle-solving’ exercises dealing 
with objective knowledge, 
independent of values and 
perceptions.  Maximum utility is 
sought; existence of an optimal 
solution is assumed.   
Only directly applicable to a single 
stakeholder.  No obvious external 
interests, little concern about how the 
wider community.  Knowledge is not 
usually made public.   
High Knowledge characterised by value 
judgements, expert and local 
knowledge, possibly involving 
incompatible commitments and 
irreducible uncertainty. 
Multiple non-equivalent observers 
and observations. Power is shared 
between conventional decision-
makers and an extended peer 
community (e.g. politicians, media 
and pressure groups) 
 
Source: Based on Davies et al., 2014; after Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990 
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Table 2. Instrumental uncertainties for meeting the fourth carbon budget 
Uncertainty Complexity 
Potential 
impact on 
4th carbon 
budget 
Potential actions to reduce / manage uncertainty Primary actors 
Instrumental uncertainties  
Availability of finance for 
low carbon power 
generation 
Medium High Implementation of electricity market reform 
Financial risk reduction measures 
Consider alternative ‘vehicles’ for investment  
Central government 
Financial community; Green Investment Bank 
Developers, utilities & equipment companies 
Commercialisation of low 
carbon power generation 
technologies 
Medium High Long term policy support 
Demonstration funding for CCS 
Evaluations / learning to inform policy adjustments 
Central government; other LCICG members 
Developers, utilities & equipment companies 
Research community 
Diversity of heat 
decarbonisation pathways 
High Medium Demonstrations of technologies and infrastructures 
Evaluations and learning 
Central, devolved and local govt 
Other LCICG members 
Businesses (utilities and equipment suppliers) 
Citizens (households and communities) 
Heat pump performance Low Medium Incentives for demonstration / deployment  
Learning and engagement with consumers (including 
businesses) 
Central, devolved and local govt 
Other LCICG members 
Citizens (households) and businesses 
Research community 
District heating investment 
/ business models 
Medium Low Demonstrations (including business models) 
Capacity building 
Extension of economic regulation to heat networks 
Central, devolved and local govt; and Ofgem 
Businesses (esp utilities, supply chain) 
Citizens (households and communities)  
Energy efficiency 
improvements / demand 
reduction 
Medium High Stronger policy incentives, especially for homes and 
small / medium sized businesses 
 
Central, devolved and local govt 
Businesses (esp supply chain)  
Citizens (households and communities) 
Diversity of transport 
decarbonisation pathways 
High Medium Support for diversity of experiments & 
demonstrations 
Learning and evaluation of experiments and demos 
Central, devolved and local govt 
Businesses (esp oil, utility and vehicle companies) 
Citizens (households and communities) 
Research community 
Electric vehicle adoption Medium Medium Financial certainty about taxation regime 
Standardisation of charging & payment systems 
More robust/ independent performance metrics 
Central government 
Businesses (esp manufacturers, DNOs) 
Citizens (early adopters) 
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Research community 
 
Table 3. Systemic uncertainties for meeting the fourth carbon budget 
Uncertainty Complexity 
Potential 
impact on 
4th carbon 
budget 
Potential actions to reduce/ manage uncertainty Primary actors 
Systemic uncertainties  
Fossil fuel availability & 
price  
High High Energy efficiency 
Diversity of supplies, routes and storage 
Carbon pricing 
Central government and Ofgem 
EU / other governments 
Businesses (esp. oil and gas companies) 
Citizens (including communities)  
Bioenergy availability & 
price  
High Medium Resource efficiency 
Sustainability standards 
Diversity 
Central government 
EU / other governments 
Businesses and citizens 
Scarce materials High Low Recycling 
Resource efficiency 
Diversity 
Central government 
Businesses (esp technology providers) 
Ecosystem service impacts High Medium More research to strengthen evidence base 
Decision making tools 
Central government 
Research community  
Businesses 
Public attitudes to energy 
system change 
High High Political engagement with respect to energy systems 
change 
Public participation in energy strategies and plans  
Government 
Citizens  
Research community / NGOs 
Political commitment to a 
low carbon transition 
Medium High Reinforce long-term policy framework with detailed 
strategies, plans and policies 
Confirm the fourth carbon budget 
Government and Parliament 
Citizens 
Businesses 
 
 
